The spontaneous brain from the mind-body to the world-brain problem

Useful for breaking up human solidarity and solidifying a robotic anthropology, this reductionist view of empsyched animals, including humans, points out that the brain's spontaneous activity and its spatiotemporal structure are central to aligning and integrating the brain within the world.
In other words, it is "discovered" that such spatiotemporal structure of neuroactivity allows the brain to extend beyond itself into body and world, creating the "world-brain relation" that is central to mental features.
Of course, psyche is mistaken with and reduced to his/her mind, or collection of inner differentiation. Inhesion is utterly schotomized; mental contents are viewed as autonomous portion of neuroactivity, associable in a mechanical-like way by unidentified, libidinous "glues".
In a XXI-century vest, the book expands XVIII-century´s robotics.
The author doesn´t know anything about iberoamerican neurobiology and shares all of the angloamerican views of mind as a mechanism, being heavily endorsed by the MIT and politically related think-tanks. A well´known author and position, all of his professional work forges neuropsychological assertions into a tool for global domination and mercantilistic hegemony.
He therefore contends that we should address consciousness and other mental features in terms of the relationship between world and brain. He says, also philosophers should consider theworld-brain problemrather than themind-body problem. This "finding" he calls a "Copernican shift in vantage point--from within the mind or brain to beyond the brain--in our consideration of mental features".
As a final, clear and deepest explanation, he proposes the world-brain relation as the ontological predisposition for consciousness.